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scientific discipline

  • 1 scientific discipline

    bilimsel öğreti

    English-Turkish dictionary > scientific discipline

  • 2 scientific discipline

    Англо-русский словарь по исследованиям и ноу-хау > scientific discipline

  • 3 scientific discipline

    bilimsel öğreti

    English-Turkish new dictionary > scientific discipline

  • 4 scientific discipline of documentation

    документоведение

    Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > scientific discipline of documentation

  • 5 discipline

    N
    1. अनुशासन
    There is no discipline amongst the students.
    2. विषय
    He is engaged in research work in a scientific discipline.
    --------
    VT
    1. अनुशासित करना
    Parents must discipline their children.

    English-Hindi dictionary > discipline

  • 6 документоведение

    scientific discipline of documentation

    Большой англо-русский и русско-английский словарь > документоведение

  • 7 Psychology

       We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of ourselves; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philosophy in the continent of nature.... [W]e proceed to human philosophy or Humanity, which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate, or distributively; the other congregate, or in society. So as Human philosophy is either Simple and Particular, or Conjugate and Civil. Humanity Particular consisteth of the same parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the Body, and of knowledges that respect the Mind... how the one discloseth the other and how the one worketh upon the other... [:] the one is honored with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. (Bacon, 1878, pp. 236-237)
       The claims of Psychology to rank as a distinct science are... not smaller but greater than those of any other science. If its phenomena are contemplated objectively, merely as nervo-muscular adjustments by which the higher organisms from moment to moment adapt their actions to environing co-existences and sequences, its degree of specialty, even then, entitles it to a separate place. The moment the element of feeling, or consciousness, is used to interpret nervo-muscular adjustments as thus exhibited in the living beings around, objective Psychology acquires an additional, and quite exceptional, distinction. (Spencer, 1896, p. 141)
       Kant once declared that psychology was incapable of ever raising itself to the rank of an exact natural science. The reasons that he gives... have often been repeated in later times. In the first place, Kant says, psychology cannot become an exact science because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense; the pure internal perception, in which mental phenomena must be constructed,-time,-has but one dimension. In the second place, however, it cannot even become an experimental science, because in it the manifold of internal observation cannot be arbitrarily varied,-still less, another thinking subject be submitted to one's experiments, comformably to the end in view; moreover, the very fact of observation means alteration of the observed object. (Wundt, 1904, p. 6)
       It is [Gustav] Fechner's service to have found and followed the true way; to have shown us how a "mathematical psychology" may, within certain limits, be realized in practice.... He was the first to show how Herbart's idea of an "exact psychology" might be turned to practical account. (Wundt, 1904, pp. 6-7)
       "Mind," "intellect," "reason," "understanding," etc. are concepts... that existed before the advent of any scientific psychology. The fact that the naive consciousness always and everywhere points to internal experience as a special source of knowledge, may, therefore, be accepted for the moment as sufficient testimony to the rights of psychology as science.... "Mind," will accordingly be the subject, to which we attribute all the separate facts of internal observation as predicates. The subject itself is determined p. 17) wholly and exclusively by its predicates. (Wundt, 1904,
       The study of animal psychology may be approached from two different points of view. We may set out from the notion of a kind of comparative physiology of mind, a universal history of the development of mental life in the organic world. Or we may make human psychology the principal object of investigation. Then, the expressions of mental life in animals will be taken into account only so far as they throw light upon the evolution of consciousness in man.... Human psychology... may confine itself altogether to man, and generally has done so to far too great an extent. There are plenty of psychological text-books from which you would hardly gather that there was any other conscious life than the human. (Wundt, 1907, pp. 340-341)
       The Behaviorist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping aside all medieval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined. (Watson, 1930, pp. 5-6)
       According to the medieval classification of the sciences, psychology is merely a chapter of special physics, although the most important chapter; for man is a microcosm; he is the central figure of the universe. (deWulf, 1956, p. 125)
       At the beginning of this century the prevailing thesis in psychology was Associationism.... Behavior proceeded by the stream of associations: each association produced its successors, and acquired new attachments with the sensations arriving from the environment.
       In the first decade of the century a reaction developed to this doctrine through the work of the Wurzburg school. Rejecting the notion of a completely self-determining stream of associations, it introduced the task ( Aufgabe) as a necessary factor in describing the process of thinking. The task gave direction to thought. A noteworthy innovation of the Wurzburg school was the use of systematic introspection to shed light on the thinking process and the contents of consciousness. The result was a blend of mechanics and phenomenalism, which gave rise in turn to two divergent antitheses, Behaviorism and the Gestalt movement. The behavioristic reaction insisted that introspection was a highly unstable, subjective procedure.... Behaviorism reformulated the task of psychology as one of explaining the response of organisms as a function of the stimuli impinging upon them and measuring both objectively. However, Behaviorism accepted, and indeed reinforced, the mechanistic assumption that the connections between stimulus and response were formed and maintained as simple, determinate functions of the environment.
       The Gestalt reaction took an opposite turn. It rejected the mechanistic nature of the associationist doctrine but maintained the value of phenomenal observation. In many ways it continued the Wurzburg school's insistence that thinking was more than association-thinking has direction given to it by the task or by the set of the subject. Gestalt psychology elaborated this doctrine in genuinely new ways in terms of holistic principles of organization.
       Today psychology lives in a state of relatively stable tension between the poles of Behaviorism and Gestalt psychology.... (Newell & Simon, 1963, pp. 279-280)
       As I examine the fate of our oppositions, looking at those already in existence as guide to how they fare and shape the course of science, it seems to me that clarity is never achieved. Matters simply become muddier and muddier as we go down through time. Thus, far from providing the rungs of a ladder by which psychology gradually climbs to clarity, this form of conceptual structure leads rather to an ever increasing pile of issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle. (Newell, 1973b, pp. 288-289)
       The subject matter of psychology is as old as reflection. Its broad practical aims are as dated as human societies. Human beings, in any period, have not been indifferent to the validity of their knowledge, unconcerned with the causes of their behavior or that of their prey and predators. Our distant ancestors, no less than we, wrestled with the problems of social organization, child rearing, competition, authority, individual differences, personal safety. Solving these problems required insights-no matter how untutored-into the psychological dimensions of life. Thus, if we are to follow the convention of treating psychology as a young discipline, we must have in mind something other than its subject matter. We must mean that it is young in the sense that physics was young at the time of Archimedes or in the sense that geometry was "founded" by Euclid and "fathered" by Thales. Sailing vessels were launched long before Archimedes discovered the laws of bouyancy [ sic], and pillars of identical circumference were constructed before anyone knew that C IID. We do not consider the ship builders and stone cutters of antiquity physicists and geometers. Nor were the ancient cave dwellers psychologists merely because they rewarded the good conduct of their children. The archives of folk wisdom contain a remarkable collection of achievements, but craft-no matter how perfected-is not science, nor is a litany of successful accidents a discipline. If psychology is young, it is young as a scientific discipline but it is far from clear that psychology has attained this status. (Robinson, 1986, p. 12)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Psychology

  • 8 law

    lo:
    1) (the collection of rules according to which people live or a country etc is governed: Such an action is against the law; law and order.) ley
    2) (any one of such rules: A new law has been passed by Parliament.) ley
    3) ((in science) a rule that says that under certain conditions certain things always happen: the law of gravity.) ley
    •
    - lawfully
    - lawless
    - lawlessly
    - lawlessness
    - lawyer
    - law-abiding
    - law court
    - lawsuit
    - be a law unto oneself
    - the law
    - the law of the land
    - lay down the law
    law n
    1. ley
    it is against the law es ilegal / va en contra de la ley
    2. derecho
    tr[lɔː]
    2 SMALLEDUCATION/SMALL derecho
    1 familiar la poli nombre femenino, la pasma
    \
    SMALLIDIOMATIC EXPRESSION/SMALL
    against the law contra la ley
    by law por ley
    in law por ley
    laws are made to be broken hecha la ley, hecha la trampa
    the law of the jungle la ley del más fuerte
    to be a law unto oneself dictar sus propias leyes
    to be outside the law estar fuera de la ley
    to go to law recurrir a la ley
    to keep within the law obrar según la ley
    to take the law into one's own hands tomarse la justicia por su mano
    law court tribunal nombre masculino de justicia
    law firm bufete nombre masculino de abogados
    law school SMALLAMERICAN ENGLISH/SMALL facultad nombre femenino de derecho
    law ['lɔ] n
    1) : ley f
    to break the law: violar la ley
    2) : derecho m
    criminal law: derecho criminal
    3) : abogacía f
    to practice law: ejercer la abogacía
    n.
    • derecho s.m.
    • fuero s.m.
    • jurisprudencia s.f.
    • ley s.f.
    • regla s.f.
    lɔː
    1)
    a) c (rule, regulation) ley f

    he's/she's a law unto himself/herself — hace lo que le da la gana

    b) u ( collectively)

    to break the law — violar or contravenir* or infringir* la ley

    it is against the law — es ilegal or está prohibido por (la) ley

    to stay within the law — actuar* dentro de la ley

    under French law — según la ley or la legislación francesa

    to lay down the law — dar* órdenes

    to take the law into one's own hands — tomarse la justicia por su (or mi etc) propia mano

    c) u (as field, discipline) derecho m; ( profession) abogacía f

    to enter the law — (BrE) hacerse* abogado; (before n)

    law school — facultad f de Derecho

    2) u

    to go to law — (BrE) recurrir a los tribunales or a la justicia

    b)

    the law — ( police) (colloq) la policía

    3) c u ( code of conduct)

    Islamic law — ( Relig) la ley del Corán

    4) c ( scientific principle) ley f
    [lɔː]
    1. N
    1) (=piece of legislation) ley f

    • there's no law against it — no hay ley que lo prohíba

    - be a law unto o.s.
    pass 2., 9)
    2) (=system of laws)

    • to be above the law — estar por encima de la ley

    • according to or in accordance with the law — según la ley, de acuerdo con la ley

    • the bill became law on 6 August — el proyecto de ley se hizo ley el 6 de agosto

    • by law — por ley, de acuerdo con la ley

    • civil/ criminal law — derecho m civil/penal

    • in law — según la ley

    • the law of the land — la ley vigente

    • officer of the law — agente mf de la ley

    • the law on abortion — la legislación sobre el aborto

    • law and order — el orden público

    • he is outside the law — está fuera de la ley

    • to have the law on one's side — tener la justicia de su lado

    • to keep or remain within the law — obrar legalmente

    • his word is law — su palabra es ley

    - lay down the law
    - take the law into one's own hands
    3) (=field of study) derecho m

    • to study law — estudiar derecho

    4) (=profession) abogacía f

    • she is considering a career in law — está pensando dedicarse a la abogacía

    • to practise law — ejercer de abogado, ejercer la abogacía

    5) (=legal proceedings)

    • court of law — tribunal m de justicia

    • to go to law — recurrir a la justicia or a los tribunales

    • to take a case to law — llevar un caso ante los tribunales

    6) (=rule) [of organization, sport] regla f

    • God's law — la ley de Dios

    7) (=standard) norma f
    8) (Sci, Math) ley f

    • by the law of averages — por la estadística, estadísticamente

    • the law of gravity — la ley de la gravedad

    nature 1., 4)
    9) * (=police)

    to have the law on sb — denunciar a algn a la policía, llevar a algn a los tribunales

    2.
    CPD

    law court N — tribunal m de justicia

    law enforcement N — aplicación f de la ley

    law enforcement agency N — organismo encargado de velar por el cumplimiento de la ley

    law enforcement officer N — (esp US) policía mf

    Law Faculty N — (Univ) facultad f de Derecho

    law firm N — gabinete m jurídico, bufete m de abogados

    Law Lord NPL — (Brit) (Pol) juez mf lor

    the Law Lords — jueces que son miembros de la Cámara de los Lores y constituyen el Tribunal Supremo

    law reports NPL — repertorio m de jurisprudencia

    law school N — (US) facultad f de derecho

    law student N — estudiante mf de derecho

    * * *
    [lɔː]
    1)
    a) c (rule, regulation) ley f

    he's/she's a law unto himself/herself — hace lo que le da la gana

    b) u ( collectively)

    to break the law — violar or contravenir* or infringir* la ley

    it is against the law — es ilegal or está prohibido por (la) ley

    to stay within the law — actuar* dentro de la ley

    under French law — según la ley or la legislación francesa

    to lay down the law — dar* órdenes

    to take the law into one's own hands — tomarse la justicia por su (or mi etc) propia mano

    c) u (as field, discipline) derecho m; ( profession) abogacía f

    to enter the law — (BrE) hacerse* abogado; (before n)

    law school — facultad f de Derecho

    2) u

    to go to law — (BrE) recurrir a los tribunales or a la justicia

    b)

    the law — ( police) (colloq) la policía

    3) c u ( code of conduct)

    Islamic law — ( Relig) la ley del Corán

    4) c ( scientific principle) ley f

    English-spanish dictionary > law

  • 9 science

    noun
    1) no pl., no art. Wissenschaft, die

    applied/pure science — angewandte/reine Wissenschaft

    2) (branch of knowledge) Wissenschaft, die
    3)

    [natural] science — Naturwissenschaften; attrib. naturwissenschaftlich [Buch, Labor]

    4) (technique, expert's skill) Kunst, die
    * * *
    1) (knowledge gained by observation and experiment.) die Wissenschaft
    2) (a branch of such knowledge eg biology, chemistry, physics etc.) die Naturwissenschaften
    3) (these sciences considered as a whole: My daughter prefers science to languages.) die Wissenschaft
    •
    - academic.ru/64728/scientific">scientific
    - scientifically
    - scientist
    - science fiction
    * * *
    sci·ence
    [ˈsaɪən(t)s]
    I. n
    1. no pl (study of physical world) [Natur]wissenschaft f
    the marvels [or wonders] of modern \science die Wunder der modernen Wissenschaft
    applied/pure \science angewandte/reine Wissenschaft
    2. (discipline) Wissenschaft f
    physics and chemistry are \sciences Physik und Chemie sind Naturwissenschaften
    3. (body of knowledge) Wissenschaft f
    \science of axioms MATH Axiomatik f
    \science of building Architekturlehre f
    the \science of climatology die Klimatologie
    \science of electricity Elektrizitätslehre f
    \science of materials TECH Werkstoffkunde f
    \science of mining Bergbaukunde f
    II. n modifier (class, experiment, reporter, teacher) Wissenschafts-
    \science laboratory wissenschaftliches Labor
    \science museum Wissenschaftsmuseum nt
    * * *
    ['saɪəns]
    n
    1) Wissenschaft f; (= natural science) Naturwissenschaft f

    things that science cannot explain —

    on the science side of the school — im naturwissenschaftlichen Zweig der Schule

    the science of life/astrology — die Lehre vom Leben/von den Gestirnen

    2) (= systematic knowledge or skill) Technik f

    it wasn't luck that helped me to do it, it was science! — das war kein Zufall, dass mir das gelungen ist, das war Können

    * * *
    science [ˈsaıəns] s
    1. a) Wissenschaft f
    b) Naturwissenschaft(en) f(pl)
    2. a) Wissenschaft f, Wissensgebiet n
    b) Naturwissenschaft f:
    the science of optics die (Lehre von der) Optik; → dismal A 1
    3. fig Kunst f, Lehre f, Kunde f:
    science of gardening Gartenbaukunst
    4. PHIL, REL Wissen n, Erkenntnis f (of von)
    5. Kunst(fertigkeit) f, (gute) Technik ( auch SPORT):
    have sth down to a science es zu einer wahren Kunstfertigkeit gebracht haben in (dat)
    7. obs Wissen n
    sc. abk
    5. scilicet, namely näml.
    sci. abk
    2. scientific wiss(enschaftl).
    * * *
    noun
    1) no pl., no art. Wissenschaft, die

    applied/pure science — angewandte/reine Wissenschaft

    2) (branch of knowledge) Wissenschaft, die
    3)

    [natural] science — Naturwissenschaften; attrib. naturwissenschaftlich [Buch, Labor]

    4) (technique, expert's skill) Kunst, die
    * * *
    n.
    Wissenschaft f.

    English-german dictionary > science

  • 10 Artificial Intelligence

       In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)
       Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)
       Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....
       When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)
       4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually
       Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)
       What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)
       [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)
       The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)
       9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form
       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:
        Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."
        Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)
       Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)
       Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)
       The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)
        14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation
       It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)
       We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.
       Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.
       Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.
    ... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)
       Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)
        16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts
       Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)
       Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System
       Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)
        19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence
       The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.
       The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)
       The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....
       AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)
        21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions
       In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)
       Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)
       Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)
       The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence

  • 11 Cognitive Science

       The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense.... [P]eople and intelligent computers turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)
       2) Experimental Psychology, Theoretical Linguistics, and Computational Simulation of Cognitive Processes Are All Components of Cognitive Science
       I went away from the Symposium with a strong conviction, more intuitive than rational, that human experimental psychology, theoretical linguistics, and computer simulation of cognitive processes were all pieces of a larger whole, and that the future would see progressive elaboration and coordination of their shared concerns.... I have been working toward a cognitive science for about twenty years beginning before I knew what to call it. (G. A. Miller, 1979, p. 9)
        Cognitive Science studies the nature of cognition in human beings, other animals, and inanimate machines (if such a thing is possible). While computers are helpful within cognitive science, they are not essential to its being. A science of cognition could still be pursued even without these machines.
        Computer Science studies various kinds of problems and the use of computers to solve them, without concern for the means by which we humans might otherwise resolve them. There could be no computer science if there were no machines of this kind, because they are indispensable to its being. Artificial Intelligence is a special branch of computer science that investigates the extent to which the mental powers of human beings can be captured by means of machines.
       There could be cognitive science without artificial intelligence but there could be no artificial intelligence without cognitive science. One final caveat: In the case of an emerging new discipline such as cognitive science there is an almost irresistible temptation to identify the discipline itself (as a field of inquiry) with one of the theories that inspired it (such as the computational conception...). This, however, is a mistake. The field of inquiry (or "domain") stands to specific theories as questions stand to possible answers. The computational conception should properly be viewed as a research program in cognitive science, where "research programs" are answers that continue to attract followers. (Fetzer, 1996, pp. xvi-xvii)
       What is the nature of knowledge and how is this knowledge used? These questions lie at the core of both psychology and artificial intelligence.
       The psychologist who studies "knowledge systems" wants to know how concepts are structured in the human mind, how such concepts develop, and how they are used in understanding and behavior. The artificial intelligence researcher wants to know how to program a computer so that it can understand and interact with the outside world. The two orientations intersect when the psychologist and the computer scientist agree that the best way to approach the problem of building an intelligent machine is to emulate the human conceptual mechanisms that deal with language.... The name "cognitive science" has been used to refer to this convergence of interests in psychology and artificial intelligence....
       This working partnership in "cognitive science" does not mean that psychologists and computer scientists are developing a single comprehensive theory in which people are no different from machines. Psychology and artificial intelligence have many points of difference in methods and goals.... We simply want to work on an important area of overlapping interest, namely a theory of knowledge systems. As it turns out, this overlap is substantial. For both people and machines, each in their own way, there is a serious problem in common of making sense out of what they hear, see, or are told about the world. The conceptual apparatus necessary to perform even a partial feat of understanding is formidable and fascinating. (Schank & Abelson, 1977, pp. 1-2)
       Within the last dozen years a general change in scientific outlook has occurred, consonant with the point of view represented here. One can date the change roughly from 1956: in psychology, by the appearance of Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin's Study of Thinking and George Miller's "The Magical Number Seven"; in linguistics, by Noam Chomsky's "Three Models of Language"; and in computer science, by our own paper on the Logic Theory Machine. (Newell & Simon, 1972, p. 4)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Cognitive Science

  • 12 Arsonval, Jacques Arsène d'

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 8 June 1851 Boric, France
    d. 31 December 1940 Boric, France
    [br]
    French physician and physicist noted for his invention of the reflecting galvanometer and for contributions to electrotherapy.
    [br]
    After studies at colleges in Limoges and later in Paris, Arsonval became a doctor of medicine in 1877. In 1882 the Collège de France established a laboratory of biophysics with Arsonval as Director, and he was Professor from 1894.
    His most outstanding scientific contributions were in the field of biological applications of electricity. His interest in muscle currents led to a series of inventions to assist in research, including the moving-coil galvanometer. In 1881 he made a significant improvement to the galvanometer by reversing the magnetic elements. It had been usual to suspend a compass needle in the centre of a large, stationary coil, but Arsonval's invention was to suspend a small, light coil between the poles of a powerful fixed magnet. This simple arrangement was independent of the earth's magnetic field and insensitive to vibration. A great increase in sensitivity was achieved by attaching a mirror to the coil in order to reflect a spot of light. For bacterial-research purposes he designed the first constant-temperature incubator controlled by electricity. His experiments on the effects of high-frequency, low-voltage alternating currents on animals led to the first high-frequency heat-therapy unit being established in 1892, and later to methods of physiotherapy becoming a professional discipline.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Académie des Sciences, Prix Montyon 1882. Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur 1884. Grand Cross 1931.
    Bibliography
    1882, Comptes rendus de l'Académie des Sciences 94:1347–50 (describes the galvanometer).
    1903, Traité de physique biologique, 2 vols, Paris (an account of his technological work).
    Further Reading
    C.C.Gillispie (ed.), 1970, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Vol. 1, New York, pp. 302–5.
    D.O.Woodbury, 1949, A Measure for Greatness, New York.
    GW

    Biographical history of technology > Arsonval, Jacques Arsène d'

  • 13 Philosophy

       And what I believe to be more important here is that I find in myself an infinity of ideas of certain things which cannot be assumed to be pure nothingness, even though they may have perhaps no existence outside of my thought. These things are not figments of my imagination, even though it is within my power to think of them or not to think of them; on the contrary, they have their own true and immutable natures. Thus, for example, when I imagine a triangle, even though there may perhaps be no such figure anywhere in the world outside of my thought, nor ever have been, nevertheless the figure cannot help having a certain determinate nature... or essence, which is immutable and eternal, which I have not invented and which does not in any way depend upon my mind. (Descartes, 1951, p. 61)
       Let us console ourselves for not knowing the possible connections between a spider and the rings of Saturn, and continue to examine what is within our reach. (Voltaire, 1961, p. 144)
       As modern physics started with the Newtonian revolution, so modern philosophy starts with what one might call the Cartesian Catastrophe. The catastrophe consisted in the splitting up of the world into the realms of matter and mind, and the identification of "mind" with conscious thinking. The result of this identification was the shallow rationalism of l'esprit Cartesien, and an impoverishment of psychology which it took three centuries to remedy even in part. (Koestler, 1964, p. 148)
       It has been made of late a reproach against natural philosophy that it has struck out on a path of its own, and has separated itself more and more widely from the other sciences which are united by common philological and historical studies. The opposition has, in fact, been long apparent, and seems to me to have grown up mainly under the influence of the Hegelian philosophy, or, at any rate, to have been brought out into more distinct relief by that philosophy.... The sole object of Kant's "Critical Philosophy" was to test the sources and the authority of our knowledge, and to fix a definite scope and standard for the researches of philosophy, as compared with other sciences.... [But Hegel's] "Philosophy of Identity" was bolder. It started with the hypothesis that not only spiritual phenomena, but even the actual world-nature, that is, and man-were the result of an act of thought on the part of a creative mind, similar, it was supposed, in kind to the human mind.... The philosophers accused the scientific men of narrowness; the scientific men retorted that the philosophers were crazy. And so it came about that men of science began to lay some stress on the banishment of all philosophic influences from their work; while some of them, including men of the greatest acuteness, went so far as to condemn philosophy altogether, not merely as useless, but as mischievous dreaming. Thus, it must be confessed, not only were the illegitimate pretensions of the Hegelian system to subordinate to itself all other studies rejected, but no regard was paid to the rightful claims of philosophy, that is, the criticism of the sources of cognition, and the definition of the functions of the intellect. (Helmholz, quoted in Dampier, 1966, pp. 291-292)
       Philosophy remains true to its classical tradition by renouncing it. (Habermas, 1972, p. 317)
       I have not attempted... to put forward any grand view of the nature of philosophy; nor do I have any such grand view to put forth if I would. It will be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the history of "howlers" and progress in philosophy as the debunking of howlers. It will also be obvious that I do not agree with those who see philosophy as the enterprise of putting forward a priori truths about the world.... I see philosophy as a field which has certain central questions, for example, the relation between thought and reality.... It seems obvious that in dealing with these questions philosophers have formulated rival research programs, that they have put forward general hypotheses, and that philosophers within each major research program have modified their hypotheses by trial and error, even if they sometimes refuse to admit that that is what they are doing. To that extent philosophy is a "science." To argue about whether philosophy is a science in any more serious sense seems to me to be hardly a useful occupation.... It does not seem to me important to decide whether science is philosophy or philosophy is science as long as one has a conception of both that makes both essential to a responsible view of the world and of man's place in it. (Putnam, 1975, p. xvii)
       What can philosophy contribute to solving the problem of the relation [of] mind to body? Twenty years ago, many English-speaking philosophers would have answered: "Nothing beyond an analysis of the various mental concepts." If we seek knowledge of things, they thought, it is to science that we must turn. Philosophy can only cast light upon our concepts of those things.
       This retreat from things to concepts was not undertaken lightly. Ever since the seventeenth century, the great intellectual fact of our culture has been the incredible expansion of knowledge both in the natural and in the rational sciences (mathematics, logic).
       The success of science created a crisis in philosophy. What was there for philosophy to do? Hume had already perceived the problem in some degree, and so surely did Kant, but it was not until the twentieth century, with the Vienna Circle and with Wittgenstein, that the difficulty began to weigh heavily. Wittgenstein took the view that philosophy could do no more than strive to undo the intellectual knots it itself had tied, so achieving intellectual release, and even a certain illumination, but no knowledge. A little later, and more optimistically, Ryle saw a positive, if reduced role, for philosophy in mapping the "logical geography" of our concepts: how they stood to each other and how they were to be analyzed....
       Since that time, however, philosophers in the "analytic" tradition have swung back from Wittgensteinian and even Rylean pessimism to a more traditional conception of the proper role and tasks of philosophy. Many analytic philosophers now would accept the view that the central task of philosophy is to give an account, or at least play a part in giving an account, of the most general nature of things and of man. (Armstrong, 1990, pp. 37-38)
       8) Philosophy's Evolving Engagement with Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science
       In the beginning, the nature of philosophy's engagement with artificial intelligence and cognitive science was clear enough. The new sciences of the mind were to provide the long-awaited vindication of the most potent dreams of naturalism and materialism. Mind would at last be located firmly within the natural order. We would see in detail how the most perplexing features of the mental realm could be supported by the operations of solely physical laws upon solely physical stuff. Mental causation (the power of, e.g., a belief to cause an action) would emerge as just another species of physical causation. Reasoning would be understood as a kind of automated theorem proving. And the key to both was to be the depiction of the brain as the implementation of multiple higher level programs whose task was to manipulate and transform symbols or representations: inner items with one foot in the physical (they were realized as brain states) and one in the mental (they were bearers of contents, and their physical gymnastics were cleverly designed to respect semantic relationships such as truth preservation). (A. Clark, 1996, p. 1)
       Socrates of Athens famously declared that "the unexamined life is not worth living," and his motto aptly explains the impulse to philosophize. Taking nothing for granted, philosophy probes and questions the fundamental presuppositions of every area of human inquiry.... [P]art of the job of the philosopher is to keep at a certain critical distance from current doctrines, whether in the sciences or the arts, and to examine instead how the various elements in our world-view clash, or fit together. Some philosophers have tried to incorporate the results of these inquiries into a grand synoptic view of the nature of reality and our human relationship to it. Others have mistrusted system-building, and seen their primary role as one of clarifications, or the removal of obstacles along the road to truth. But all have shared the Socratic vision of using the human intellect to challenge comfortable preconceptions, insisting that every aspect of human theory and practice be subjected to continuing critical scrutiny....
       Philosophy is, of course, part of a continuing tradition, and there is much to be gained from seeing how that tradition originated and developed. But the principal object of studying the materials in this book is not to pay homage to past genius, but to enrich one's understanding of central problems that are as pressing today as they have always been-problems about knowledge, truth and reality, the nature of the mind, the basis of right action, and the best way to live. These questions help to mark out the territory of philosophy as an academic discipline, but in a wider sense they define the human predicament itself; they will surely continue to be with us for as long as humanity endures. (Cottingham, 1996, pp. xxi-xxii)
       In his study of ancient Greek culture, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche drew what would become a famous distinction, between the Dionysian spirit, the untamed spirit of art and creativity, and the Apollonian, that of reason and self-control. The story of Greek civilization, and all civilizations, Nietzsche implied, was the gradual victory of Apollonian man, with his desire for control over nature and himself, over Dionysian man, who survives only in myth, poetry, music, and drama. Socrates and Plato had attacked the illusions of art as unreal, and had overturned the delicate cultural balance by valuing only man's critical, rational, and controlling consciousness while denigrating his vital life instincts as irrational and base. The result of this division is "Alexandrian man," the civilized and accomplished Greek citizen of the later ancient world, who is "equipped with the greatest forces of knowledge" but in whom the wellsprings of creativity have dried up. (Herman, 1997, pp. 95-96)

    Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Philosophy

  • 14 board

    комитет; совет; комиссия; планшет; доска; пульт; борт; совершать посадку (на) ; садиться (напр. на корабль, машину) ; разг. «комиссовать, увольнять по состоянию здоровья; пропускать через комиссию; см. тж. committee

    Army Airborne, Electronics and Special Warfare board — комитет СВ по авиационным бортовым электронным системам и специальным методам ведения боевых действий

    — target status board

    English-Russian military dictionary > board

  • 15 Education

       In Portugal's early history, education was firmly under the control of the Catholic Church. The earliest schools were located in cathedrals and monasteries and taught a small number of individuals destined for ecclesiastical office. In 1290, a university was established by King Dinis (1261-1325) in Lisbon, but was moved to Coimbra in 1308, where it remained. Coimbra University, Portugal's oldest, and once its most prestigious, was the educational cradle of Portugal's leadership. From 1555 until the 18th century, primary and secondary education was provided by the Society of Jesus (Jesuits). The Catholic Church's educational monopoly was broken when the Marquis of Pombal expelled the Jesuits in 1759 and created the basis for Portugal's present system of public, secular primary and secondary schools. Pombal introduced vocational training, created hundreds of teaching posts, added departments of mathematics and natural sciences at Coimbra University, and established an education tax to pay for them.
       During the 19th century, liberals attempted to reform Portugal's educational system, which was highly elitist and emphasized rote memorization and respect for authority, hierarchy, and discipline.
       Reforms initiated in 1822, 1835, and 1844 were never actualized, however, and education remained unchanged until the early 20th century. After the overthrow of the monarchy on the Fifth of October 1910 by Republican military officers, efforts to reform Portugal's educational system were renewed. New universities were founded in Lisbon and Oporto, a Ministry of Education was established, and efforts were made to increase literacy (illiteracy rates being 80 percent) and to resecularize educational content by introducing more scientific and empirical methods into the curriculum.
       Such efforts were ended during the military dictatorship (192632), which governed Portugal until the establishment of the Estado Novo (1926-74). Although a new technical university was founded in Lisbon in 1930, little was done during the Estado Novo to modernize education or to reduce illiteracy. Only in 1964 was compulsory primary education made available for children between the ages of 6 and 12.
       The Revolution of 25 April 1974 disrupted Portugal's educational system. For a period of time after the Revolution, students, faculty, and administrators became highly politicized as socialists, communists, and other groups attempted to gain control of the schools. During the 1980s, as Portuguese politics moderated, the educational system was gradually depoliticized, greater emphasis was placed on learning, and efforts were made to improve the quality of Portuguese schools.
       Primary education in Portugal consists of four years in the primary (first) cycle and two years in the preparatory, or second, cycle. The preparatory cycle is intended for children going on to secondary education. Secondary education is roughly equivalent to junior and senior high schools in the United States. It consists of three years of a common curriculum and two years of complementary courses (10th and 11th grades). A final year (12th grade) prepares students to take university entrance examinations.
       Vocational education was introduced in 1983. It consists of a three-year course in a particular skill after the 11th grade of secondary school.
       Higher education is provided by the four older universities (Lisbon, Coimbra, Oporto, and the Technical University of Lisbon), as well as by six newer universities, one in Lisbon and the others in Minho, Aveiro, Évora, the Algarve, and the Azores. There is also a private Catholic university in Lisbon. Admission to Portuguese universities is highly competitive, and places are limited. About 10 percent of secondary students go on to university education. The average length of study at the university is five years, after which students receive their licentiate. The professoriate has four ranks (professors, associate professors, lecturers, and assistants). Professors have tenure, while the other ranks teach on contract.
       As Portugal is a unitary state, the educational system is highly centralized. All public primary and secondary schools, universities, and educational institutes are under the purview of the Ministry of Education, and all teachers and professors are included in the civil service and receive pay and pension like other civil servants. The Ministry of Education hires teachers, determines curriculum, sets policy, and pays for the building and upkeep of schools. Local communities have little say in educational matters.

    Historical dictionary of Portugal > Education

  • 16 motivation

    Gen Mgt
    1. the creation of stimuli, incentives, and working environments which enable people to perform to the best of their ability in pursuit of organizational success. Motivation is commonly viewed as the magic driver that enables managers to get others to achieve their targets. In the 20th century, there was a shift, at least in theory, away from motivation by dictation and discipline, exemplified by Frederick Winslow Taylor’s scientific management, toward motivation by creating an appropriate corporate climate and addressing the needs of individual employees. Although it is widely agreed to be one of the key management tasks, it has frequently been argued that one person cannot motivate others but can only create conditions for others to self-motivate. Many management theorists have provided insights into motivation. Elton Mayo’s Hawthorne experiments identify some root causes of selfmotivation, and Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs provides insight into personal behavior patterns. Other influential research has been conducted by Frederick Herzberg, who looked at job satisfaction, and Douglas McGregor whose Theory X and Theory Y suggest management styles that motivate and demotivate employees.
    2. (S. Africa)
    a formal written proposal

    The ultimate business dictionary > motivation

  • 17 Dakin, Henry Drysdale

    SUBJECT AREA: Medical technology
    [br]
    b. 12 March 1880 Hampstead, England
    d. 10 February 1952 Scarborough-on-Hudson, New York, USA
    [br]
    English biochemist, advocate and exponent of the treatment of wounds with antiseptic fluid, Dakin's solution (Eusol).
    [br]
    The youngest of a family of eight of moderate means, Dakin received his early education in Leeds experiencing strict scientific training as a public analyst. He regarded this as having been of the utmost value to him in his lifelong commitment to the emerging discipline of biochemistry.
    He was one of the earliest to specialize in the significance of optical activity in organic chemistry, and obtained his BSc from Manchester in 1901. Following this, he worked at the Lister (Jenner) Institute of Preventive Medicine and at Heidelberg. He then received an invitation to join Christian Herter in a private research laboratory that had been established in New York. There, for the rest of his life, he continued his studies into a wide variety of biochemical topics. Christian Herter died in 1910, and six years later his widow and Dakin were married.
    Unable to serve in the First World War, he made a major contribution, in collaboration with Carrel, with the technique for the antiseptic irrigation of wounds with a buffered hypochlorite solution (Eusol), a therapy which in the 1990s is still an accepted approach to the treatment of infected wounds. The original trials were carried out on the liner Aquitania, then serving as a hospital ship in the Dardanelles.
    [br]
    Principal Honours and Distinctions
    Fellow of the Royal Society 1917. Davy Medal 1941. Honorary doctorates, Yale, Leeds and Heidelberg Universities.
    Bibliography
    1915, "On the use of certain antiseptic substances in the treatment of infected wounds", British Medical Journal.
    1915, with A.Carrel, "Traitement abortif de l'infection des plaies", Bulletin of the
    Academy of Medicine.
    MG

    Biographical history of technology > Dakin, Henry Drysdale

  • 18 philosophy

    1. философия
    2. принцип
    3. основные принципы

     

    основные принципы
    —
    [А.С.Гольдберг. Англо-русский энергетический словарь. 2006 г.]

    Тематики

    EN

     

    принцип
    взгляд
    мнение
    —
    [ http://www.iks-media.ru/glossary/index.html?glossid=2400324]

    Тематики

    • электросвязь, основные понятия

    Синонимы

    EN

     

    философия
    —
    [ http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    EN

    philosophy
    The academic discipline concerned with making explicit the nature and significance of ordinary and scientific beliefs and investigating the intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument concerning their presuppositions, implications, and interrelationships; in particular, the rational investigation of the nature and structure of reality (metaphysics), the resources and limits of knowledge (epistemology), the principles and import of moral judgment (ethics), and the relationship between language and reality (semantics). (Source: CED)
    [http://www.eionet.europa.eu/gemet/alphabetic?langcode=en]

    Тематики

    EN

    DE

    FR

    Англо-русский словарь нормативно-технической терминологии > philosophy

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